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Abstract: The usual decomposition of effects in corner solution models into extensive and
intensive margins is generally incompatible with a causal interpretation. This paper proposes
a decomposition based on the joint distribution of potential outcomes which is meaningful
in a causal sense. The difference between decompositions can be substantial and yield dia-
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1 Introduction
Many outcomes of interest in economics are nonnegative and have a cluster of observations
at the value zero. Prominent examples include working hours, health care demand, and
expenditure data. More generally, variables with these features are referred to as corner
solution outcomes (Wooldridge, 2002), which suggests the idea of utility maximization
under constraints where both interior and corner solutions occur, for instance due to kinks
in budget constraints.
Researchers analyzing effects of variables on corner solution outcomes frequently take
interest in decomposing the effect into the part attributable to individuals starting to
participate (called extensive margin), and the part attributable to already participating
individuals (called intensive margin). The decomposition used is algebraically straightfor-
ward as it is based on factoring the expectation of the corner solution variable, say E(Y ),
into the participation probability Pr(Y > 0) and the conditional expectation E(Y |Y > 0)
(McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). The extensive margin is driven by the participation effect
[PE], the change in the probability to participate; the intensive margin is driven by the
conditional-on-positives effect [COP], the change in the outcome given participation.
In contrast to the simplicity of the mechanical aspect, endowing the decomposition with
a causal interpretation is substantially more problematic. For instance, recent work framing
the problem in terms of Rubin’s potential outcomes model has pointed out that COP effects
do not measure the impact of a treatment on participating individuals; rather, they are
hopelessly contaminated by a sort of selection bias, even in experimental settings (Angrist,
2001; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). An apparent solution is resorting to the interpretation of
effects on underlying, latent variables such as in censored regression and sample-selection
models, where causal interpretation is feasible. However, as these authors and others
emphasize (cf. Dow and Norton, 2003), latent outcomes are artificial and lack a meaningful
interpretation in corner solution contexts.
In this article, I propose a conceptually different decomposition of the effect into ex-
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tensive and intensive margins. It is based on the joint distribution of potential outcomes,
which ensures that the resulting parts are meaningful in a causal sense. Indeed, the new de-
composition succeeds in representing the total effect as an average of the treatment effects
for interesting subgroups of the population: those induced to participate by the treatment,
and those participating regardless of it. Like the conventional decomposition, this one is not
identified nonparametrically, although sharp bounds can be derived for the average treat-
ment effect of the population subgroups. Imposing some more structure point-identifies
the decomposition. Examples include a class of generalized Tobit models, which are widely
used in applied research. For these models, the differences between decompositions can be
major.
An application to the gravity model of trade compares the two decompositions in a real-
world setting. The decomposition of trade effects into extensive and intensive margins is an
issue of ongoing interest in the recent empirical trade literature (Felbermayr and Kohler,
2006; Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008; Liu, 2009). Here, I estimate the effect of a
hypothetical reduction in entry regulation costs on bilateral trade flows, and decompose it
into country margins. The estimates suggest that the usual decomposition overstates the
contribution of the extensive margin by around 15%.
Practitioners confronted with limited dependent variables in many diverse fields of ap-
plied economics and other social sciences will find this article to be of interest. Examples
of work featuring the decomposition of effects into extensive and intensive margins include
estimates of the effect of benefit-receiving on food expenditure (Hastings and Washington,
2010), the effect of various variables on intra- and inter-firm trade (Co, 2010), the effect
of employer contributions on employee pension savings (Engelhardt and Kumar, 2007) the
effect of worker productivity or unionization on working overtime (Sousa-Poza and Ziegler,
2003, and Trejo, 1993, respectively), the effect of managers’ tax evasion preferences on un-
derreporting corporate income (Joulfaian, 2000), the effect of various regressors on youth
unemployment (Caspi et al. 1998), and the effect of health knowledge on health outcomes
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(Kenkel, 1991). The list is neither complete nor representative, but it is suggestive of the
widespread use of the decomposition in corner solution applications.
This article contributes to the growing recent literature on treatment effects for limited
dependent variables (Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Chen, 2010; Chiburis, 2010;
Fan and Wu, 2010). Since its emphasis lies on conceptual definition of objects of interest
and interpretation, it is close in spirit to Angrist (2001). The representation of treatment
effects as weighted sums of population groups is influenced by Angrist and Imbens (1994).
As this framework is expressible in latent index models (Vytlacil, 2002), latent index rep-
resentations with binary endogenous variables obtain expressions that resemble the ones
presented below. Conceptually, they are quite different, because in the endogenous treat-
ment literature, the population subgroups are defined by their potential treatment status
in response to an instrument, while here the groups are defined by their potential outcome
status in response to the (exogenous) treatment.
The plan for the article is this: the next section reprises the Angrist-Pischke “bad COP”-
critique, presents the alternative decomposition and discusses its nonparametric identifi-
cation. Section 3 exemplifies the new approach for some common Tobit-type models, and
section 4 provides the application to the gravity model of trade. Section 5 contains a
concluding discussion.
2 Corner solutions and potential outcomes
Consider the causal effect of a binary treatment Ti on the corner solution variable Yi ≥ 0
for individuals i = 1, . . . , N . Let Y1i denote the outcome for i if i received the treatment,
i.e. Ti = 1, and Y0i if Ti = 0, so that as usual
Yi = Y0i + (Y1i − Y0i)Ti
The focus here will be on the causal treatment effect Y1i−Y0i. Assume that the data comes
from an ideal randomized controlled trial, so that assignment to treatment is random and
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compliance is perfect. Then, Ti is independent of (Y1i, Y0i), and the average treatment effect
[ATE] E(Y1i−Y0i) can be obtained from the prima-facie contrast E(Yi|T = 1)−E(Yi|T = 0).
Using
E(Yi|Ti) = Pr(Yi > 0|Ti)E(Yi|Yi > 0, Ti)
this contrast can be written as
E(Yi|T = 1)− E(Yi|Ti = 0) ={
Pr(Yi > 0|Ti = 1)− Pr(Yi > 0|Ti = 0)
}
E(Yi|Yi > 0, Ti = 1)
+
{
E(Yi|Yi > 0, Ti = 1)− E(Yi|Yi > 0, Ti = 0)
}
Pr(Yi > 0|Ti = 0) (1)
This is the usual decomposition applied to limited dependent variables like Yi in Tobit
(Tobin, 1958) or Cragg (1971) models (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980; cf. also the standard
graduate textbooks by Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, Greene, 2008, and Wooldridge, 2002).
The first term after the equality sign is the extensive margin effect, which weights the PE
—the term in curly brackets— by the expected Yi conditional on participation; the second
term is the intensive margin effect, which weights the COP (in curly brackets) by the
probability of participation given Ti = 0. Angrist (2001) and Angrist and Pischke (2009)
suggest rewriting COP in terms of potential outcomes as
E(Yi|Yi > 0, Ti = 1)− E(Yi|Yi > 0, Ti = 0)
= E(Y1i|Y1i > 0, Ti = 1)− E(Y0i|Y0i > 0, Ti = 0)
= E(Y1i|Y1i > 0)− E(Y0i|Y0i > 0)
= E(Y1i − Y0i|Y1i > 0) +
{
E(Y0i|Y1i > 0)− E(Y0i|Y0i > 0)
}
(2)
The second equality follows by independence of Ti from Y1i and Y0i. If only independence
from Y0i was assumed, as in Angrist’s (2001) formulation, (2) would need to be written
conditional on Ti = 1. This has no bearing on the present argument. As can be seen from
the terms after the third equality, COP is composed of two terms. The first, E(Y1i−Y0i|Y1i >
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0), can be given a causal interpretation. It is the treatment effect for the subpopulation of
individuals having positive Yi when Ti = 1. The second term, E(Y0i|Y1i > 0)− E(Y0i|Y0i >
0), can be understood as a form of selection bias. The selection bias in COP arises because
treatment has an effect on the composition of the group with Yi > 0: The interest lies in
those with Y1i > 0, but the COP contrast also involves the group Y0i > 0 which might be a
super- or sub-set of the group Y1i > 0, but not the same unless treatment has no effect on
the participation probability. Thus, the analysis in (2) implies that using a decomposition
like (1) cannot identify a causal effect even in ideal settings like a randomized controlled
trial.
However, the more fundamental problem is that the first term in (2) is not an object
of direct interest in a decomposition into extensive and intensive margins. The ATE for
individuals with Y1i > 0 mixes the ATE for the two population groups the decomposi-
tion set out to discriminate, the ones participating even without treatment and the ones
participating because of the treatment.
2.1 Decomposition based on joint outcomes
Consider the following classification of individuals into non-overlapping and exhausting
groups based on their joint distribution of potential outcomes, (Y0i, Y1i):
Group Name Potential outcomes
NP Non-participants (Y0i = 0, Y1i = 0)
S1 Switchers (Y0i = 0, Y1i > 0)
S2 Switchers (Y0i > 0, Y1i = 0)
P Participants (Y0i > 0, Y1i > 0)
Basing the definition of intensive and extensive margin effects on these groups clarifies
their meaning substantially. The intensive margin effect is the contribution to the ATE of
group P. Similarly, the extensive margin is the ATE contribution of switchers, i.e. those
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changing their participation status (groups S1 and S2). These are the objects of interest
when decomposing causal effects into extensive and intensive margins; when researchers
write about them, it is this what they mean (although they rarely state it so explicitly).
For instance, take the labor economics example of working hours. The effect of a policy
intervention increasing average working hours in the economy can be decomposed into
– the average change in hours worked of those working regardless of the intervention,
– plus the average hours worked by those joining the workforce because of the intervention,
– minus the average hours worked by those leaving the workforce because of the interven-
tion,
the groups being weighted by their population fraction.
Often researchers choose models which possess some monotonicity assumption on the
way treatment affects outcomes (Manski, 1997). This can lead to the elimination of one
group out of S1 and S2. For instance, a strong monotone treatment response assumption
states that the causal effect Y1i − Y0i is either nonnegative or nonpositive for all i. In the
working hours example, this means that if the policy increased working hours of workers,
no one is induced to leave the workforce (group S2 is ruled out). Such an assumption
is embedded in the Tobit model. The monotone treatment response assumption can be
weaker and still eliminate one group. Tautologically, it is sufficient that the causal effect is
either positive for all i with Y0i = 0 or Y1i = 0, or negative. This assumption is implicit in
Cragg’s (1971) model. Often such assumptions are motivated by economic theory, and for
many applications it might be plausible to impose them. Finally, the effect for individuals
in group NP is always zero.
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Thus, formally, the decomposition of the ATE based on the joint distribution of potential
outcomes is
E(Yi|T = 1)− E(Yi|T = 0) = EY1i,Y0i [E(Y1i − Y0i)|Y1i, Y0i] (3)
= E(Y1i|Y0i = 0, Y1i > 0) Pr(Y0i = 0, Y1i > 0)
+ E(−Y0i|Y0i > 0, Y1i = 0) Pr(Y0i > 0, Y1i = 0)
+ E(Y1i − Y0i|Y0i > 0, Y1i > 0) Pr(Y0i > 0, Y1i > 0)
As before, the left-hand side of (3) corresponds to E(Y1i − Y0i) because of randomized
treatment assignment. The expectation over (Y1i, Y0i) is with respect to the four events
NP, S1, S2 and P. The last term is the intensive margin effect [IME], the first two are the
extensive margin effect [EME], though as noted most models used in the literature will
eliminate one of these.
2.2 Nonparametric identification
A comparison between (1) and (3) shows that they are distinct decompositions even under
the monotone treatment response assumption. To highlight the difference, section 3 applies
(1) and (3) to some of the most common corner solution response models in the literature.
In those models, the decomposition based on joint potential outcomes is identified because
considerable structure is imposed through functional form restrictions. Alternative identi-
fying assumptions are discussed in the concluding section. In this section, it is shown that
the decomposition is not identified nonparametrically: Experimental data combined with
a monotone treatment response assumption alone do not point-identify all the objects of
interest involved in the decomposition. The considerations below use the weaker monotone
treatment response assumption that the treatment effect is either positive for all switchers,
or negative.
A more compact notation will facilitate the exposition. Define the population fractions
of switchers piS ≡ Pr(Yi0 = 0, Yi1 > 0) and participants piP ≡ Pr(Yi0 > 0, Yi1 > 0). Simi-
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larly, define mean potential outcomes of switchers (Y¯ S0 , Y¯
S
1 ) and of participants (Y¯
P
0 , Y¯
P
1 )
(for instance, Y¯ S0 = E(Yi1|Yi0 = 0, Yi1 > 0)). Then, the decomposition of the average
treatment effect might be written as
ATE = piSY¯ S1 + pi
P (Y¯ P1 − Y¯ P0 ) = piSATES + piPATEP (4)
for the case Y¯ S0 = 0, i.e. the case of group S2 having mass zero. The reverse case (Y¯
S
0 >
0, Y¯ S1 = 0), i.e. group S1 having mass zero, will not be considered — being symmetric,
it gives no additional insights. Given the monotone treatment response assumption that
one of the two cases holds, population regression of Di ≡ 1(Yi > 0) on Ti reveals which it
is: The difference E(Di|Ti = 1) − E(Di|Ti = 0) corresponds to the difference between the
S1-fraction and the S2-fraction in the population. Thus, if E(Di|Ti = 1) > E(Di|Ti = 0), it
must be that the S2-fraction has mass zero.
Population regression of Di on Ti can then be used to determine the population fractions
of switchers and participants
piS = E(Di|Ti = 1)− E(Di|Ti = 0) and piP = E(Di|Ti = 1)
The term Y¯ P0 is also identified by the data; Y¯
P
0 = E(Yi|Di = 1, Ti = 0). The problem
is identification of Y¯ S1 and Y¯
P
1 for which only one quantity exists in the data, E(Yi|Di =
1, Ti = 1):
E(Yi|Di = 1, Ti = 1) = ωSY¯ S1 + (1− ωS)Y¯ P1 , ωS =
piS
piS + piP
Thus, it is impossible to disentangle them without making more assumptions; it follows
that the decomposition is not identified nonparametrically — it is not possible to attribute
a fraction of ATE to the extensive or intensive margin. However, since ATE, piS and piP
are all identified, it is possible to derive sharp bounds for ATES and ATEP using (4).
The bounds depend on the sign of ATE. Assume ATE < 0 first. Since ATES > 0
(because S2 is ruled out, as before), this means ATE
P must be negative. The domain
of ATES is the positive real line (0;∞); the domain of ATEP is the interval (−Y¯ P0 ; 0).
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Substituting the limits of these intervals into (4) the identification regions for the objects
of interest reduce to
ATES ∈ (0, (ATE + piP Y¯ P0 )/piS) , ATEP ∈ (0,ATE/piP )
The bounded regions are strictly smaller than the supports, and therefore informative.
Consider now ATE > 0. The data do not reveal the sign of the average treatment effect
for participants. A strong monotone treatment response assumption would restrict it to be
positive, so that ATEP ’s domain would be (0,∞). In that case, a similar argument to the
one above gives the following intervals for the ATE in the two population groups:
ATES ∈ (0,ATE/piS) , ATEP ∈ (0,ATE/piP )
If one is unwilling to make this strong monotonicity assumption, the possibility of a neg-
ative ATE for participants has to be taken into account, which widens the domain of
ATEP ; identification intervals are also widened in consequence but remain informative.
If ATEP < 0 this bounding strategy does not reduce ATEP ’s domain which remains
(−Y¯ P0 , 0). Combined with the previous result it follows that ATEP ∈ (−Y¯ P0 ,ATE/piP ),
while ATES ∈ (0, (ATE + piP Y¯ P0 )/piS).
As in other partial identification settings (Manski, 2003), the availability of an additional
discrete exogenous variable, say Xi, could tighten the upper bound for ATE
S further if Xi
was related to the probability of being a switcher. Bounds for the average treatment effect
could then be calculated for every value of the exogenous variable. The new upper bound
for ATES resulting from adding the conditional-on-Xi bounds weighted by the mass points
of Xi could be smaller than the ones given above. Similar arguments can be made for the
bounds of participants.
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3 Decomposing ATE in some common structural
models
This section illustrates the decomposition based on joint potential outcomes for a class of
models in which the objects of interest are point-identified.
3.1 Tobit model
The Tobit model (Tobin, 1958) is arguably the most popular model for corner solution de-
pendent variables. It consists of three parts: a latent variable with a linear index structure,
a distributional assumption for the error and an observation mechanism. These are
Y ∗i = β0 + β1Ti + Ui , Ui|, Ti ∼ N(0, σ2) , Yi = max(0, Y ∗i ) (5)
Consider the case β1 > 0, which imposes that Yi is non-decreasing in Ti. The ATE in this
model is
E(Yi|Ti = 1)− E(Yi|Ti = 0) = Φ1 (β0 + β1 + σφ1/Φ1)− Φ0 (β0 + σφ0/Φ0)
where Φ1,Φ0 are the cdf of the standard normal distribution evaluated at (β0 + β1)/σ and
β0/σ, respectively, and φ1, φ0 are the corresponding pdf. The conventional decomposition
(1) would split this between extensive and intensive margin as follows
I˜ME = (β1 + σφ1/Φ1 − σφ0/Φ0)Φ0 E˜ME = (Φ1 − Φ0)(β0 + β1 + σφ1/Φ1)
As was discussed before, it is difficult to assign a causal interpretation to I˜ME and E˜ME.
In the Tobit model, the distribution of potential outcomes of an individual is completely
determined by her realization of the stochastic part Ui. Assume β1 > 0, for concreteness.
Then, individuals with Ui smaller than −β0 − β1 never have a positive Yi; they constitute
group NP (see Fig. 1). Similarly, if Ui lies between (−β0 − β1) and (−β1), individuals are
group S1 switchers. (S2 switchers, i.e. individuals dropping out of participation because
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of treatment, are incompatible with the structure of the model when β1 > 0.) E˜ME
correctly identifies the fraction of switchers (Φ1−Φ0) but fails to attribute the correct ATE.
Rather, it assigns to them the average Yi in the population of switchers and participants.
This overestimates their contribution, as switchers’ Ui are in the bottom tail of the error
distribution among those with Y1i > 0. Their true ATE is β0+β1+E(Ui|−β0−β1 ≤ Ui < β1).
Thus the correction term is the expectation of a doubly-truncated normal variable. Table
1 contains the features of switchers and participants in the Tobit model. Multiplying the
second by the fourth row gives the causal IME and EME.
- - - Figure 1 and Table 1 about here - - -
Consider a numerical example to illustrate the difference which using the decomposition
based on joint potential outcomes can make. Suppose the DGP is (5) with β0 = 0, β1 =
1, σ2 = 1. Then the ATE is about 0.68. The conventional decomposition assigns about 0.24
to the intensive and 0.44 to extensive margin effect. In contrast, the decomposition into
causally meaningful margins reveals that of the total ATE of 0.68, 0.5 is due to the intensive
and only 0.18 due to the extensive margin effect. The intensive margin contribution, which
was only 36% using the old decomposition, is thus really 73%.
Similarly stark discrepancies are possible in practice. For instance, McDonald and
Moffitt’s (1980) application examined the effect of a negative income tax on working hours
reductions by estimating a Tobit model. Using their decomposition, it assigned 22% of the
estimated reduction in working hours to the extensive margin. A follow-up article by Moffitt
(1982) reevaluated the same data. In this article, he modified the Tobit model to account
for a model of labor market frictions. Incidentally, this leads to the same formulas for the
decomposition as the ones using the decomposition based on joint outcomes presented in
Table 1. Applying this decomposition, he now concluded that the extensive margin was
responsible not for 22%, but for 84% of the reduction. The present article shows that even
in the absence or misspecification of the specific labor market frictions model postulated
in Moffitt (1982), the causal extensive margin contribution is 84%.
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Coming back to the numerical illustration from before, the example DGP can also be
used to illustrate the bounds discussed in the previous section. Here, the average treatment
effect for participants, ATEP , is 1 (= β1), and the ATE for switchers, ATE
S, is about 0.54.
A researcher ignoring the DGP and reluctant to make any assumptions on it can conclude
that ATEP ∈ (0; 1.36) and ATES ∈ (0; 2).
3.2 Selection and two-part models
There are several generalizations and alternatives to the Tobit model that are formulated
in the same framework (Cragg, 1971; Heckman, 1979; Duan et al., 1983; Amemiya, 1985).
One variant postulates
Yi = Di exp(β0 + β1Ti + Ui)
Di = 1(α0 + α1Ti + Vi)
(6)
with (Ui, Vi) ∼ BV N(0, 0, σ2, 1, ρ). The exponential transformation of the right-hand side
of Yi ensures positivity of Yi. It is common to refer to model (6) as ‘selection model’ when
the errors are correlated, and as ‘two-part’ model when errors are independent (Hay and
Olsen, 1984). It is clear from (6) that here, in contrast to the Tobit model, the signs of
extensive and intensive margin need not be the same, as they are driven by the signs of
α1 and β1, respectively. Moreover, (6) models the participation decision (the equation for
Di) and the outcome conditional on participation as (potentially) driven by two separate
errors (Ui and Vi). Analogously to the Tobit model, the population fraction of groups are
(Φ1−Φ0) for switchers and Φ0 for participants, where now Φ1 = Φ(α0+α1) and Φ0 = Φ(α0).
Consider the two-part model first, i.e. assume correlation ρ = 0. The essential feature
of the two-part model is that because the errors are independent, the conditional error
expectation E(exp(Ui)|Vi) = exp(0.5σ2) is the same for switchers and participants. This
means that both decompositions coincide: A switcher has an expected treatment effect
of exp(β0 + β1 + 0.5σ
2) which is just E(Yi|Yi > 0, Ti = 1), and participants experience
a percental change of exp(β1) − 1. Or, in terms of the analysis in (2), the selection bias
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in the COP effect vanishes in this model because E(Y0i|Y1i > 0) = E(Y0i|Y0i > 0) =
exp(β0 + 0.5σ
2).
The assumption of zero selection bias is unwarranted in most applications. While ran-
domization prevents dependence between treatment and the errors, there is no experiment
which could possibly break the potential dependence between Ui and Vi — and applica-
tions where the researcher can be certain that this dependence is absent seem difficult to
envision.
Thus, consider the selection model which allows correlation between the errors. Since
the model estimated in the application in the following section is a selection model with
covariates, model (6) is rewritten to accommodate this feature. With covariates, model (6)
is
Yi = Di × exp(Xiβ + βTTi + Ui) (7)
Di = 1(Ziα + αTTi + Vi ≥ 0) (8)
with (Ui, Vi) | Ti, Xi, Zi ∼ BV N(0, 0, σ2, 1, ρ). This distributional assumption implies that
treatment and regressors are independent of the errors. Regressors are collected in two
vectors Zi and Xi with corresponding coefficient vectors α and β. No exclusion restriction
is placed on covariates. In principle, they can be identical, disjoint or overlapping, although
economic considerations will commonly lead to a set of overlapping, if not identical, vari-
ables.
The normality assumption implies a probit model for the decision to participate, Pr(Di =
1|Zi) = Φ(Ziα+αTTi). Then, for given Zi, switchers are defined by values of Vi lying in the
interval S ≡ [−Ziα−αT ;−Ziα), and participants by Vi ∈ P ≡ [−Ziα;∞). For observations
with characteristics Zi, the fractions of participants and that of switchers are
Pr(Vi ∈ P ) = Φ(Ziα), Pr(Vi ∈ S) = Φ(Ziα + αT )− Φ(Ziα)
As seen previously, both decompositions assign the same value to the population fraction,
but they differ in assigning average treatment effects for switchers and participants. For
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switchers, ATES conditional on covariates is
ATES = ATE(Xi, Zi, Vi ∈ S) =
exp(Xiβ + βT + 0.5σ
2)
Φ(σρ+ Ziα + αT )− Φ(σρ+ Ziα)
Φ(Ziα + αT )− Φ(Ziα) (9)
the correction term is the doubly-truncated expectation E(exp(Ui)|Vi ∈ S). Instead, the
standard decomposition uses the expectation of Yi given Di = 1 and Ti = 1 for ATE
S. The
expectation of Yi conditional on participation is (cf. Terza, 1998)
E(Yi|Di = 1, Zi, Xi) = exp(Xiβ + βTTi + 0.5σ2)Φ(σρ+ Ziα + αTTi)
Φ(Ziα + αTTi)
(10)
where the correction term is the simple truncated expectation E(exp(Ui)|Xi, Vi > −Ziα−
αTTi). Essentially, this produces the same pattern of discrepancies between decompositions
as in the Tobit model, although |ρ| < 1 will lessen the magnitude of the difference (with the
two-part model being the limit case). In this model, the relative size of the conventional
extensive margin effect (E˜ME) relative to the causal one (EME) depends solely on the
linear index of the participation equation Ziα, αT and σρ, but not on β and βT :
E˜ME
EME
=
(
1− Φ(Ziα)
Φ(Ziα + αT )
)/(
1− Φ(σρ+ Ziα)
Φ(σρ+ Ziα + αT )
)
(11)
Thus, ρ > 0 (ρ < 0) implies that the conventional distribution overestimates (underesti-
mates) the causal EM. Also, for a given value of ρ, the extent of the discrepancy is increasing
in both Ziα and αT .
For participants, the conditional average treatment effect is
ATEP = ATE(Xi, Zi, Vi ∈ P ) = (exp(βT )− 1) exp(Xiβ)Φ(σρ+ Ziα)
Φ(Ziα)
(12)
while the conventional decomposition prescribes
exp(Xiβ + βT + 0.5σ
2)
Φ(σρ+ Ziα + αT )
Φ(Ziα + αT )
Φ(Ziα)− exp(Xiβ + 0.5σ2)Φ(σρ+ Ziα)
Unconditional ATE for switchers and participants can be obtained by taking expecta-
tions over the distribution of (Zi, Xi), e.g. ATE
S = EZi,Xi [ATE(Xi, Zi, Vi ∈ S)].
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4 An application: The trade effect of reducing the
number of bureaucratic firm-entry-regulation
procedures
This section applies the new decomposition to an empirical trade model. Traditionally, the
determinants of trade volumes were estimated in a single-equation, constant-elasticity grav-
ity model (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Feenstra, 2008). However, the large fraction of
zeros in aggregated trade datasets spanning many countries has motivated a new strand of
empirical literature which favors a two-equations model (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein,
2008). The first equation addresses the zeros directly by modeling trade participation.
The second equation models trade flows conditional on participation. The trade volume
equation is specified as a traditional gravity model. With these equations, explanatory
variables can influence trade flows at two country margins, the extensive margin –the de-
cision to trade– and the intensive margin –average trade flows of trading country-pairs. In
this application, I will analyze the trade effect of a hypothetical policy intervention which
would reduce the number of bureaucratic procedures needed to set up a business legally.
The empirical model is the generalized Tobit model (7)-(8). The indicator variable
Di declares the presence or absence of trade between a directed country-pair i, and the
variable Yi will denote its trade volume (Yi ≥ 0). The term “directed country-pair” means
here that for every pair of countries there are two observations: the exports of the first to
the second and vice versa. The vector of variables explaining the decision to trade are Zi,
the variables explaining the trade volume Xi, and unobserved variables (as well as pure
randomness) in the participation and volume equations are Vi and Ui, respectively. The
set of variables Xi and Zi can contain distinct elements, in principle. Indeed, much of
the theoretic motivation for the two-equations model comes from the idea that zero trade
flows are due to the impossibility of overcoming fixed costs which are necessary to establish
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trade (Hallak, 2006). This suggests that Zi contains “fixed costs” and Xi “variable costs”
of trading. In practice, however, the case seems less clear-cut as at the aggregate country-
level the variables observed are not the “costs” directly, but rather rough proxies for them,
such as distance between capital cities, which makes it hard to distinguish between fixed
and variable costs. For instance, firm entry regulation measures such as the number of
procedures should primarily be a fixed cost and not affect variable trading costs (Helpman,
Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008). But Djankov et al. (2002) relate such costs to corruption
and shadow economies which are likely to affect variable trade costs as well. Baranga (2009,
fn. 9) provides an alternative argument against excluding firm entry regulation variables
from Xi: “[A] country with higher regulatory barriers may also be more likely to be a
higher tax environment, which would be expected to reduce the profitability of exporting
at the intensive margin too. Countries with more regulation might also be more likely to use
quantitative trade restrictions such as import or export licenses, or other non-tariff barriers,
which would also affect the intensive margin, but are typically not controlled for.” Thus,
no exclusion restrictions will be placed on the variables here, so that Xi = Zi. Finally,
adopting the assumption of bivariate normal errors facilitates comparison with previous
studies.
Estimation of (7)-(8) can be carried out by full information ML. Here, I will estimate
the model by the standard “Heckit” two-step procedure, which in a first step estimates (8)
by Probit ML, and uses the estimated αˆ to estimate
ln(Yi) = Xiβ + σρφ(Xiαˆ)/Φ(Xiαˆ) + i (13)
by OLS in the sample with Di = 1 (second step). The estimating equation (13) can be
seen as an approximation to moment-based estimation using the condition E[Yi−E(Yi|Di =
1, Xi)|Xi] = 0, where E(Yi|Di = 1, Xi) is given in (10). In particular, the inverse Mills ratio
is a first order approximation to the multiplicative correction term in (10) (Greene, 1998).
The objects of interest are ATE, IME and EME associated with the policy interven-
tion of reducing the number of bureaucratic procedures; they can be computed from the
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parameter estimates of the probit equation and of (13) using the formulas provided in the
preceding section.
4.1 Data
The data is taken from the study by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), which the
authors kindly make publicly available on the internet (the data can be downloaded from
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/helpman/Data Sets Helpman). It is pooled from
different sources, including Feenstra’s World Trade Flows, the Penn World Tables and the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators; and is described in detail in Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein’s (2008) Appendix I. Part of their analysis uses country-level data on reg-
ulation costs of firm entry collected by Djankov et al. (2002). Specifically, they create two
dummy variables indicating a country-pair having high regulation costs. The first is based
on the number of bureaucratic procedures it takes to set up a business in a given country,
and the number of days that it takes to complete these procedures. The variable equals one
when both countries in the pair are above the median according to these criteria. Similarly,
the second dummy equals one when importer and exporter are above the median according
to regulation costs as measured as a percentage of countries’ GDP. In addition to these two
binary variables, I use the sum of the number of procedures required in the importing and
in the exporting country of a pair; this is the variable of interest in this application.
- - - Table 2 about here - - -
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis are presented in Table 2.
They correspond to the year 1986 (with the exception of the regulation cost variables, which
are from 1999). The dataset consists of 11,978 country-pairs of 106 exporter countries and
114 importer countries. The asymmetry stems from countries serving the whole (sampled)
world as exporters. As it is necessary to estimate sets of exporter and importer fixed effects
to control for multilateral effects (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra; 2004), all-
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world exporters were dropped from the dataset to avoid perfect prediction in the decision-
to-trade equation. As can be seen from the number of observations for the logarithm of
bilateral trade, only 6,572 out of 11,978 (or 55%) of the country-pairs engage in trade. To
explain trade flows, I broadly follow the specification of Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein.
The regressors include great-circle distance between capitals in log-Kilometers (Distance),
the gravity equation variable par excellence. To capture geography-related trade costs
further, the indicator variables Landlock (at least one country in pair is landlocked), Island
(at least one country in pair is an island), and Land border (countries share a common
border) are used in the specification. Cultural and historical similarities are proxied by the
dummy variables Legal (origin of legal systems of the countries are the same), Language
(countries have common language), Colonial ties (one country was/is the other’s colony)
and Religion, a continuous index ranging from 0 to 1, which aggregates the similarity in the
composition of Catholics, Protestants and Muslims in the countries. As discussed above,
regulation costs are mapped by the indicators Reg. costs (% GDP) and Reg. costs (days
& proc.), as well as No. of procedures.
4.2 Estimation results
The estimated coefficients of a two-stage Heckit procedure are reported in Table 3. The
explanatory variables included a set of importer and exporter fixed effects. Due to collinear-
ity, it was not possible to estimate a separate exporter fixed effect for Chad in neither of
the two equations. Thus, there is only one joint exporter fixed effect for South Africa, the
base-category country, and Chad.
- - - Table 3 about here - - -
Despite the slightly different data set and specification, the coefficients in Table 3 are
very similar to the results of Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). Specifically, I would
like to focus on the effect of the following policy intervention: cutting back two bureaucratic
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procedures. Two procedures correspond to about half a standard deviation of the variable,
and one can think of the intervention as both importer and exporter country eliminating
each one bureaucratic hurdle. The effect of the number of procedures on trade is large, judg-
ing from the results in Table 3: Two procedures less is expected to increase the probability
of trading by about 12%-points for the average country-pair (here: Xiαˆ = 0.46); a trading
country-pair is expected to increase its trade volume by about 146% (= exp(−2×−0.45)−1)
on average in response to such a policy intervention. Of course, such causal interpretations
are only valid if all model assumptions hold; in particular, if regressors are independent of
errors.
Consider as an example country-pairs for which the average predicted probability of
participation is 0.5. Observations with such an average probability include trade from
Romania to Bolivia or from Ethiopia to South Korea, which is positive; as well as trade
from Romania to Honduras or from Cambodia to South Korea, which is zero. Table 4
shows the estimated ATE, EME and IME for such country-pairs. In the first row of Table
4 it is assumed that σρ = 0. As discussed previously, the two decompositions (1) and (3) of
the ATE coincide in this case. The model has been estimated using ln(y) as the dependent
variable. To retransform predictions to levels, an estimate of σ2 is needed. Such an estimate
is not directly available because the two-step estimator only gives σ̂ρ. Therefore, Duan’s
(1983) smearing estimator was used to obtain predictions in levels. The total effect of 893
corresponds to an increase in expected trade flows of about 140%. Of the 893, the extensive
margin contributes 39%.
But assume first that σρ = 0, and calculate the total effect and its decomposition under
this premise (first row in Table 4). As discussed previously, the two decompositions (1)
and (3) of the ATE coincide in this case. The model has been estimated using ln(y) as
the dependent variable. To retransform predictions to levels, an estimate of σ2 is needed.
Such an estimate is not directly available because the two-step estimator only gives σ̂ρ.
Therefore, Duan’s (1983) smearing estimator was used to obtain predictions in levels. The
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total effect of 893 corresponds to an increase in expected trade flows of about 140%. Of
the 893, the extensive margin contributes 39%.
- - - Table 4 about here - - -
The estimated coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio, σ̂ρ, is 0.20 with a p-value of 2.4%,
suggesting that there is some dependence between errors. Rows (2)-(5) of Table 4 show
estimates of the total effect and its decomposition with correlation. Row (2) contains an es-
timate as may be found in previous literature. It uses the standard decomposition (1), and
approximates the conditional expectation function E(Yi|Di = 1, Xi) by ηˆ exp(Xiβˆ + σ̂ρλˆi),
where ηˆ is used to denote the smearing estimate of E(exp()|x) and λˆi is the estimated
inverse Mills ratio for Xi. Row (4) contains results of the same decomposition but using
the exact functional forms of section 3.2. It turns out that the difference between using ap-
proximate (with inverse Mills ratio) and exact expectations (with multiplicative correction
term) is negligible in this application.
Regarding the relative contribution of extensive and intensive country margin to the
total effect, the differences between omitting correlation and taking it into account are
small in this case (39% vs. 40%). The magnitude of the total effect is also quite close to
the one ignoring correlation. Thus, the relative effect necessarily needs to be smaller, since
the expectations conditioning on the error correlation are larger than the ones omitting
the adjustment factor because Φ(σρ + Xiα)/Φ(Xiα) > 1 for positive ρ. The difference is
almost 20%-points (139% vs. 122%).
Comparing the results of the conventional decomposition to the one proposed in this
paper based on country-types, the shift in the contribution of the margins is clearly visible.
The extensive margin contribution decreases by 6%-points going from row (4) to (5), a 15%
difference. The reason for this drop is that with positive correlation, the doubly-truncated
expectation of the error underlying the new decomposition will always be lower than the
error expectation truncated from below at the upper bound of the doubly-truncated ex-
pectation which underlies the conventional method. The total effect is the same. While
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for the approximations in rows (2) and (3) this identity is slightly veiled, it holds precisely
when using the exact functional forms in rows (4) and (5).
The overestimation of the extensive margin is not limited to this group of country-pairs,
of course. For instance, using country-pairs at the mean Xiαˆ, the overestimation of the
extensive margin by the standard decomposition is over 20%. Using the estimated value
of ρ (= 0.2), and of αT (= −2×−0.2 = 0.4), Fig. 2 plots the ratio of conventional versus
causal EME (cf. Eq. 11) over some of the range of the participation probability, Φ(Xiα).
The increase in overestimation is quite steep.
- - - Figure 2 about here - - -
5 Discussion
This paper presented a decomposition of average treatment effects in corner solution models
into extensive and intensive margins based on the joint distribution of potential outcomes.
The new decomposition is a weighted sum of the ATE of subgroups of the population —
switchers and participants—, and it differs markedly from the traditional decomposition,
which lacks an interesting causal interpretation. This was demonstrated in a numerical ex-
ample for the Tobit model, and in a substantive application to international trade flows for
a generalization of the Tobit model. By relying on very strong distributional assumptions,
these models display tractable closed forms which are useful for both illustration and for
comparison with previous research.
However, the decomposition of treatment effects presented here is also applicable to
semiparametric models. One such class are latent factor structure models (Aakvik, Heck-
man and Vytlacil, 2005). These models relax the functional form assumptions, but in
turn require an exclusion restriction. I.e., an instrumental variable is needed which affects
switchers but not participants. An alternative assumption which would have identifying
power within linear-index models would be that participants and switchers display (dif-
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ferent) index heteroskedasticity, as in Klein and Vella (2009). Both functional form and
exclusion restriction assumptions are non-refutable, but their plausibility might differ de-
pending on the application.
While the choice of decomposition matters in general, it makes no difference under
the two-part model. The reason for this is the assumed error independence in the class
of two-part models I considered. This assumption is unattractive, but it seems that it is
not a necessary ingredient of two-part models. Duan et al. (1984) provide an example of
a two-part model with correlated errors where the correlation parameter does not enter
the likelihood function. Thus, consistent parameter estimates can still be obtained con-
veniently by separate probit and linear regressions. In such two-part models, the correct
decomposition would differ from the traditional — however, neither decomposition could
be calculated (nor even the ATE) as the correlation parameter is unavailable. Thus, this
hardly seems to make the two-part model more attractive for causal inference.
The causally meaningful decomposition of the ATE does not come free of cost: It re-
quires more assumptions than needed for the ATE alone, as it deals with potential outcomes
jointly. As applied work often makes assumptions that go well beyond the required for the
decomposition, however, choosing the correct decomposition does seem to be almost free
of cost. For instance, all the applied articles cited in the introduction imposed enough
structure to point-identify the causal decomposition.
Finally, while this article examined the decomposition into effects at margins in a simple
experimental setting where nonparametric identification fails, other experimental settings
can be devised which have point-identifying power under weaker conditions. Pre-treatment
measurements of Yi is one such setting. If it can be ensured that individual-specific un-
observables do not vary over time (Ui = Uit for periods t = 0, 1), the decomposition is
nonparametrically identified.
22
References
Aakvik, Arild, James J. Heckman and Edward J. Vytlacil (2005), “Estimating treatment
effects for discrete outcomes when responses to treatment vary: an application to
Norwegian vocational rehabilitation programs”, Journal of Econometrics, 125(1),
pp. 15-51.
Amemiya, Takeshi (1985), Advanced Econometrics, Harvard University Press.
Anderson, James E. and Eric van Wincoop (2003), “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution
to the Border Puzzle”, American Economic Review, 93(1), pp. 170-192.
Angrist, Joshua D. (2001), “Estimation of limited dependent variable models with dummy
endogenous regressors: simple strategies for empirical practice”, Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics 19(1), pp. 2-16.
Angrist, Joshua D. and Jo¨rn-Steffen Pischke (2009), Mostly Harmless Econometrics, Prince-
ton University Press.
Variables:
Baranga, Thomas (2009), “Unreported Trade Flows and Gravity Equation Estimation”,
unpublished manuscript, IRPS, UC San Diego.
Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi (2005), Microeconometrics, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Caspi, Avshalom, Bradley R. Entner Wright, Terrie E. Moffitt, Phil A. Silva (1998), “Early
Failure in the Labor Market: Childhood and Adolescent Predictors of Unemployment
in the Transition to Adulthood” American Sociological Review 63(3), pp. 424-451.
Chen, Songnian (2010), “Non-Parametric Identification and Estimation of Truncated Re-
gression Models”, Review of Economic Studies, 77(1), pp. 127-153.
Chiburis, Richard C. (2010), “Semiparametric bounds on treatment effects”, Journal of
Econometrics, 159(2), pp. 267-275.
Co, Catherine Yap (2010), “Intra- and inter-firm US trade ”, International Review of
Economics and Finance, 19(2), pp. 260-277.
Cragg, John G. (1971), “Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with
Application to the Demand for Durable Goods”, Econometrica, 39(5), pp. 829-844.
23
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, (2002),
“The Regulation of Entry”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), pp. 1-37.
Dow, William H. and Edward C. Norton (2003), “Choosing Between and Interpreting the
Heckit and Two-Part Models for Corner Solutions”, Health Services and Outcomes
Research Methodology, 4(1), pp. 5-18.
Duan, Naihua (1983), “Smearing estimate: a nonparametric retransformation method”,
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 78(3), pp. 605-610.
Duan, Naihua, Willard G. Manning, Jr., Carl N. Morris, Joseph P. Newhouse (1983), “A
Comparison of Alternative Models for the Demand for Medical Care”, Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, 1(2), pp. 115-126.
Duan, Naihua, Willard G. Manning, Jr., Carl N. Morris, Joseph P. Newhouse (1984),
“Choosing between the Sample-Selection Model and the Multi-Part Model”, Journal
of Business and Economic Statistics, 2(3), pp. 283-289.
Engelhardt and Kumar (2007), “Employer matching and 401(k) saving: Evidence from the
health and retirement study”, Journal of Public Economics, 91(10), pp. 1920-1943.
Fan, Yanqin and Jisong Wu (2010), “Partial Identification of the Distribution of Treatment
Effects in Switching Regime Models and its Confidence Sets”, Review of Economic
Studies, 77(3), pp. 1002-1041.
Feenstra, Robert C. (2004), Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, Prince-
ton University Press.
Feenstra, Robert C. (2008), “Gravity Equation”, in: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Eco-
nomics, Second Edition, Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, Palgrave
Macmillan.
Felbermayr, Gabriel J. and Wilhelm Kohler (2006), “Exploring the intensive and extensive
margin of world trade”, Review of World Economics 2006, 142(4), pp. 642-674.
Greene, William H. (1998), “Sample selection in credit-scoring models”, Japan and the
World Economy, 10(3), pp. 299-316.
Greene, William H. (2008), Econometric Analysis, 6th edition, Prentice Hall.
Hallak, Juan Carlos (2006), “Product quality and the direction of trade”, Journal of
International Economics, 68(1), pp. 238-365.
24
Hastings, Justine and Ebonya Washington (2010), “The First of the Month Effect: Con-
sumer Behavior and Store Responses.” American Economic Journal: Economic Pol-
icy, 2(2), pp. 142-162.
Hay, Joel W. and Randall J. Olsen (1984), “Let Them Eat Cake: A Note on Compar-
ing Alternative Models of the Demand for Medical Care”, Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics, 2(3), pp.279-282.
Heckman, James J. (1979), “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error”, Economet-
rica, 47(1), pp. 153-161.
Helpman, Elhanan, Marc Melitz and Yona Rubinstein (2008), “Estimating Trade Flows:
Trading Partners and Trading Volumes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2),
pp. 441-487.
Joulfaian, David (2000), “Corporate Income Tax Evasion and Managerial Preferences”,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(4), pp. 698-701.
Kenkel, Donald S. (1991), “Health Behavior, Health Knowledge, and Schooling”, Journal
of Political Economy, 99(2), pp. 287-305.
Klein, Roger and Francis Vella (2009), “A Semiparametric Model for Binary Response and
Continuous Outcomes Under Index Heteroscedasticity”, Journal of Applied Econo-
metrics, 24(5), pp. 735-762.
Liu, Xuepeng (2009), “GATT/WTO Promotes Trade Strongly: Sample Selection and
Model Specification”, Review of International Economics, 17(3), pp. 428-446.
Manski, Charles F. (1997), “Monotone treatment response”, Econometrica, 65(6), pp.
1311-1334.
Manski, Charles F. (2003), Identification for Prediction and Decision, Harvard University
Press.
McDonald, John F. and Moffitt, Robert A. (1980), “The Uses of Tobit Analysis”, Review
of Economics and Statistics, 62(2), pp. 318-321.
Moffitt, Robert A. (1982), “The Tobit Model, Hours of Work and Institutional Con-
straints”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 64(3), pp. 510-515.
Santos Silva, Joa˜o M.C. and Silvana Tenreyro (2006), “The Log of Gravity”, Review of
Economics and Statistics, 88(4), pp. 641-658.
25
Sousa-Poza, Alfonso and Alexandre Ziegler (2003), “Asymmetric information about work-
ers’ productivity as a cause for inefficient long working hours”, Labor Economics,
10(6), pp. 727-747.
Terza, Joseph V. (1998), Estimating count data models with endogenous switching: Sam-
ple selection and endogenous treatment effects, Journal of Econometrics, 84(1), pp.
129-154.
Tobin, James (1958), “Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables”,
Econometrica, 26(1), pp. 24-36.
Trejo, Stephen S. (1993), “Overtime Pay, Overtime Hours, and Labor Unions”, Journal
of Labor Economics, 11(2), pp. 253-278.
Vytlacil, Edward (2002), “Independence, Monotonicity and Latent Index Models: An
Equivalence Result”, Econometrica, 77(1), pp. 331-341.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data,
MIT Press.
26
Table 1: Features of participants and switchers in the Tobit model
Participants Switchers
(Y0i > 0, Y1i > 0) (Y0i = 0, Y1i > 0)
Ui (−β0,∞) (−β0 − β1,−β0)
Pr(Y1i, Y0i) Φ0 Φ1 − Φ0
Y1i − Y0i β1 β0 + β1 + Ui
E(Y1i − Y0i) β1 β0 + β1 + σ φ1−φ0Φ1−Φ0
Notes: ΦT = Φ(β0 + β1T ), φT = φ(β0 + β1T ), for T = 0, 1.
Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf, φ(·) the standard normal pdf. The
Tobit model in this table has the latent variable Y ∗i = β0 +β1Ti+Ui,
with Ui|Ti ∼ N(0, σ2) and β1 > 0.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No. of obs.
Bilateral trade 79,804.40 991,081.28 0 74,558,336 11,978
Log of Bilateral Trade 8.33 3.04 1.61 18.13 6,572
Distance 4.17 0.8 0.3 5.66 11,978
Land border 0.02 0.15 0 1 11,978
Island 0.17 0.37 0 1 11,978
Landlock 0.36 0.48 0 1 11,978
Legal 0.36 0.48 0 1 11,978
Language 0.26 0.44 0 1 11,978
Colonial ties 0.01 0.09 0 1 11,978
Religion 0.17 0.25 0 0.99 11,978
No. of procedures 19.59 4.86 4 36 11,978
Reg. costs high (%GDP) 0.33 0.47 0 1 11,978
Reg. costs high (days & proc.) 0.12 0.33 0 1 11,978
Source: Data are from Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), available online. See text Section 4.1.
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Table 3: Estimated coefficients — Two-equations model of bilateral trade
Regression Pr(d = 1|x) E(ln y|y > 0, x)
Method ML (Probit) OLS
(1) (2)
Distance -0.62** -1.22**
(0.03) (0.04)
Land border -0.16 0.67**
(0.13) (0.14)
Island -0.54* -0.44
(0.24) (0.25)
Landlock -0.14 -0.42*
(0.12) (0.17)
Legal 0.15** 0.55**
(0.04) (0.06)
Language 0.32** 0.19**
(0.06) (0.07)
Colonial ties -0.02 0.89**
(0.35) (0.19)
Religion 0.33** 0.32**
(0.09) (0.11)
No. of procedures -0.20** -0.45**
(0.03) (0.05)
Reg. costs high (%GDP) -0.27** -0.13
(0.08) (0.09)
Reg. costs high (days & proc.) -0.16* -0.25*
(0.07) (0.11)
Inv. Mills ratio 0.20*
(0.09)
R2 0.57 0.69
logL -3,580 -12,760
Observations 11,978 6,572
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ and ∗∗ denote statistical significance
on the 5% and 1% level. Additional regressors include a constant term and a complete
set of importer fixed effects and of exporter fixed effects.
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Table 4: Total trade effects and decomposition into country margins
TE TE/E(y|x) EME IME
Decomposition (% of TE) (% of TE)
(1) No error correlation 893 139% 347 546
(39%) (61%)
(2) Conventional decomposition, approx. 888 122% 353 535
(40%) (60%)
(3) Decomposition by country-type, approx. 892 123% 308 584
(35%) (65%)
(4) Conventional decomposition, exact 879 122% 349 530
(40%) (60%)
(5) Decomposition by country-type, exact 879 122% 302 577
(34%) (66%)
Notes: Own calculations based on results from Table 3. TE stands for Total Effect, EME for Extensive Margin
Effect, and IME for Intensive Margin Effect. Formulas are discussed in Section 3.2. Effects are for a country-pair
with Xαˆ = −0.2 and Xβˆ = 5.32.
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Figure 1: Population groups by Ui in the Tobit model
(−β0−β1) (−β0)
Ui
fUi|Ti(Ui|Ti)
ParticipantsNon-participants Switchers
1
Notes: The Tobit model in this figure has the latent variable Y ∗i = β0 + β1Ti +Ui, with
Ui|Ti ∼ N(0, σ2) and β1 > 0.
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Figure 2: Overestimation of extensive margin effect (EME) in estimated trade model
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Notes: Own calculations based on results from Table 3. “Base probability of participa-
tion” means participation probability without treatment (reduction in “No. of proc.”).
Base probability of participation plotted over range 0.1–0.9. “Ratio usual EME / causal
EME” is E˜ME/EME as in Eq. (11), calculated for estimated values of σ̂ρ (= 0.2) and
αˆT (= −2×−0.2 = 0.4).
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